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In  hiring new workers, risk-neutral employers equate the present expected 
value of each worker's  compensation to the present expected value of hisher 
productivity,  Data detailing how present expected compensation varies with 
the age of hire embed, therefore, information about how productivity varies 
with age.  This paper infers age-productivity profiles using data on the 
present expected value of earnings of new hires of a Fortune 1000 firm.  For 
each of the five occupation/sex groups considered, productivity falls with 
age, with productivity exceeding earnings for young workers and vice versa for 
older workers. 
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Understanding how productivity varies with workers* age is-important  for 
a variety of reasons.  A decline in productivity with age implies that aging 
societies must increasingly depend on the labor supply of the young and 
middle-aged.  It also means that policies designed to keep the elderly in the 
work force,  while potentially good for the elderly,  may decrease overall 
productivity.  A third implication is that,  absent government intervention, 
employers may not be willing to hire the elderly for the same compensation  as 
they provide to younger workers. 
Labor economists are particularly interested in the relationship between 
productivity and age because it can help them in testing alternative theories 
of the labor market.  The simplest of these is the spot market theory, in 
which workers are paid,  at least annually, their marginal product.  Few,  if 
any,  economists view the spot market theory as reasonable.  Kotlikoff and Wise 
(1985) present fairly strong evidence against it,  demonstrating that many, if 
not most, defined-benefit pension plans induce sharp discontinuities in  vested 
pension accrual at particular ages.  Under the spot market theory,  there 
should be offsetting discontinuities in  wage compensation at these ages,  but 
these are not evident in the data. 
In contrast to the spot market theory,  contract theories of labor markets 
imply only a present-value relationship between compensation and productivity. 
Consider, for example, the contracts that would be written by risk-neutral 
employers.  In these contracts,  although earnings in any single year can 
exceed or be less than that year's productivity, the present expected value of 
the worker's output will equal the present expected value of his or her 
compensation. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmDifferent contract theories have different implications concerning the 
relationship of productivity and wages as the worker ages.  One such theory is 
the specific human capital model of Mincer (1974) and Becker (1975).  It 
suggests that if firms are free to fire older workers, the age-wage profile 
will be structured such that earnings exceed productivity when workers are 
young and vice versa when they are old.  On the other hand, in Becker and 
Stigler's  (1974) and Lazear's  (1979, 1981) agency models of worker shirking, 
workers receive less than their marginal product when young,  with the 
difference paid out in the form of wages, accrued pension benefits, or 
severance pay in excess of the marginal product when they are old.  The 
efficiency wage models of Harris and Todaro (1970),  Stofft (1982).  Yellen 
(1984),  Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),  and Bulow and Summers (1986) provide a 
view of the labor market similar to that of Lazear.  These models stress the 
payment of above-market-clearing  wages as a mechanism to induce greater worker 
effort when such effort is not fully observable.  As shown by Akerlof and Katz 
(1985),  these models yield identical predictions to the Lazear/Becker and 
Stigler agency model concerning age-earnings profiles,  with the difference in 
the models involving the use of employment fees and performance bonds to clear 
the market in agency models, but not in efficiency-wage models. 
The evidence to date on the age-productivity relationship is limited and 
mixed.  Medoff and Abraham (1981) find that older workers' pay increases 
although indices of productivity decline, suggesting  wages in excess of 
marginal products toward the end of the work span.  Lazear and Moore (1984) 
report that the earnings profiles of the self-employed are flatter than those 
of employees,  also suggesting earnings in excess of productivity among older 
employees.  Kahn and Lang (1986),  in contrast,  examine responses to questions 
concerning desired hours of work; they find that older workers, with earnings 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmin excess of their marginal products, are likely to be hours-constrained by 
their employers and,  therefore, desire to work more.  The opposite is true if 
earnings of older workers are below their marginal products.  Kahn and Lang's 
empirical findings support the view that marginal productivity exceeds 
earnings for older workers. 
Knowledge of the difference between age-wage and age-productivity 
profiles is potentially quite important to the financial valuation of firms.  1 
Suppose, for example,  that wages are less than productivity for younger 
workers and greater than productivity for older workers.  Then, for each firm, 
the excess of its present expected payment of wages to its existing workers 
less the present expected productivity of these workers - its backloaded 
compensation - represents an implicit liability.  The word implicit refers to 
the fact that firms do not carry such liabilities on their books.  Neverthe- 
less,  if the market is aware of these liabilities, the firm's market valuation 
will be less by a corresponding amount.  Hence, the shapes of the age- 
compensation  and age-productivity profiles are important for determining the 
ratio of a firm's market value to its replacement costs - its q.  Summers 
(1981) points out the low q values for U.S. firms for much of the postwar 
period.  These low q values are surprising given Salinger's (1984) findings of 
high price-cost margins,  which imply much more market power and higher profits 
than are indicated by the observed values of q.  Like Summers' tax adjustments 
to q,  backloaded compensation  may go a long way toward reconciling the low 
observed values of q. 
This paper assumes risk-neutral employers and estimates the age- 
productivity relationship for a single firm using the first-order condition 
that the present expected value of total compensation equals the present 
expected value of productivity; workers hired at different ages have different 
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present expected values of productivity.  Hence, if one parameterizes the age- 
productivity relationship, the parameters of this relationship can be identi- 
fied from information on how total present expected compensation varies with 
age. 
The data in the study are earnings histories for more than 300,000 
employees of a Fortune 1000 corporation covering the period 1969 to 1983. 
Although its name cannot be disclosed, the firm is involved primarily in 
sales.  These data are advantageous not only because one can control for the 
firm,  but also because one can determine precisely the accrued pension 
compensation arising under the firm's  defined-benefit pension plan.  At 
particular ages and amounts of service, pension compensation in this firm is 
an important component of total compensation. 
The results indicate that productivity declines with age and that older 
workers are paid more than they produce to offset having been paid less than 
they produced when young.  For some occupation/sex groups, the difference 
between productivity and compensation at young and old ages is sizable.  The 
results support the bonding models of Becker and Stigler (1974) and Lazear 
(1979, 1981), as well as the efficiency wage models.  The results seem less 
compatible with the Becker-Mincer  human capital model. 
These results should be viewed cautiously, however, for a number of 
reasons.  First, they apply only to the firm in question.  Similar analyses of 
productivity and compensation profiles for other firms could reach quite 
different conclusions.  Second, the analysis assumes that the form of 
contracts remains constant over the sample period.  Third, the probability of 
remaining employed is treated as exogenous and time invariant, rather than as 
an endogenous choice of the employer.  Fourth, the analysis assumes the age- 
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the results may be subject to selectivity bias if (1)  different workers within 
an occupation group have contracts that differ in  ways other than their 
initial wage and (2)  the composition of workers who join or leave the firm at 
particular ages is correlated  with the characteristics of the contract. 
The paper continues as follows.  The next section introduces the basic 
methodology.  Section I1 presents the data,  and section I11 examines the 
results.  Section IV briefly considers the potential importance of the 
findings for firms' values of q.  Finally,  section  V states conclusions and 
suggests additional research. 
I. Methodology 
To understand our multiperiod model and its use in inferring the age- 
productivity relationship, it may help first to consider a very simple one- 
good,  two-period model with an interest rate of zero.  Assume that some 
workers work when they are both young and old and that other workers work only 
when they are old,  but that both types of  workers are equally productive when 
old.  Further assume that to reduce shirking by young workers, to encourage 
human capital formation, or for other reasons,  workers who are hired when 
young are paid less (more) than their marginal product when young and more 
(less) than their marginal product when old. 
Let Z  and Zo stand,  respectively,  for the present values of compensation 
Y 
of those hired when young and those hired when old.  Because workers who are 
hired when old are paid their marginal product, Zo is also the productivity of 
older workers, and because Z equals the sum of the marginal products of a 
Y 
worker when he is young and when he is old (recall the interest rate is zero), 
Z  -Z  is the productivity of younger workers.  Thus,if  we know Z and Zo,  we  Y  0  Y 
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falls with age; if Z  -Z  < Zo,  productivity rises with age. Note that if  Y  0 
workers are paid their productivity each period, this method will also 
generate the correct age-productivity relationship. 
We now consider a multiperiod model in which the interest rate is non- 
zero,  in which workers may leave the firm,  and in which productivity, in 
addition to depending on age,  may depend on service,  on the date the worker is 
hired, and on the worker's  individual characteristics.  The firm in our model 
is assumed to have a constant-returns production function that depends on 
capital and labor.  Labor input is assumed to differ across workers only in 
terms of effective units; that is,  the labor input of one worker is a perfect 
substitute for that of any other,  but the number of effective labor units is 
different for each worker.  The firm is assumed to have full knowledge of the 
worker's productivity at the time he or she is hired.  Let Yt,  Lt,  and Kt 
stand for output,  labor,  and capital,  respectively,  in year t.  The concave 
production function is 
where 
Equation (2) sums the labor input of workers hired this year and in past 
years.  Specifically,  we assume that ages 18 and 75 are the minimum and 
maximum ages of workers.  Hence,  the firm at time s has no workers hired 
before year s-57, which is the first year included in the summation.  The term 
Nj,,  stands for the number of workers hired in year j  at initial hiring age a. 
Of course,  not all of the workers hired in the past stay with the firm.  The 
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a+s-j,  who joined the firm at age a, and who have remained with the firm 
through year s  .  Finally, h(a+s-j  ,a,  s) denotes the productivity in year s of 
workers age a+s-j  who joined the firm at age a. 
The expected present value of real profits of the firm at time t, nt, is 
given by 
(3)  Rt = Et x  [PsYs - Is,t  ] R'-~ 
s-t 
-  Ns,aes,a  p-t - X 
Ns,aDs,a, 
s-t  a-18  s-t-57  a-18 
where Et is the expectation operator at time t, Ps is the real price of output 
in year s,  R is one divided by one plus the real interest rate, Is is invest- 
ment in year s (Is=Ks+l-Ks),  e  is the present (discounted to year s)  s,a 
expected value of compensation payments to workers hired in year s at age a, 
and Ds,,  is the present expected value of remaining compensation payments to 
workers hired in year s<t at age a.  Equation (3) states that the present 
expected value of profits equals the present expected value of output, less 
the present expected value of compensation paid to current and future hires, 
less the present expected value of remaining compensation paid to past hires. 
At time t, the future values of Ps are uncertain; as a consequence the future 
values of Ys are also uncertain. 
In maximizing the present expected value of profits, firms are 
constrained to structure compensation payments to provide workers with compe- 
titive levels of expected utility.  In addition, they may face anti-shirking 
constraints, requiring that they structure the time path of compensation to 
reduce or eliminate worker malfeasance.  Regardless of these side constraints, 
the first-order  condition for hiring workers age a in year t is that the 
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compensation; that is, 
t+75-a 
(4)  Et  X  ~,~~,~(a+s-t,  a,  t)h(a+s-t  ,  a,  S)R~-~  - et,  a, 
s-t 
where FlS is the marginal product of labor in year s.  The summation in (4) 
runs from year t to the year in  which.the  worker,  who is now age a,  reaches 
age 75,  which is 75-a years from year t.  The product PSFls gives the marginal 
revenue product of one unit of effective labor in year s.  Multiplying this 
product by h(a+s-t,a,s)  gives the marginal revenue product in year s of the 
worker hired at age a and who is, in year s,  a+s-t  years of age.  The term 
q(  ...) adjusts for the probability that the worker hired at age a in year t is 
still with the firm in year s (when he is age a+s-t). 
The present expected value of compensation of a worker hired in year t at 
age a,  et,a,  can be expressed in terms of the time path of future annual 
compensation.  Let w(i,a,s)  stand for the total annual compensation  paid to 
workers who are age i in year s and who joined the firm at age a;  Then 
--a 
According to (5),  the present expected value of total compensation of the 
worker who is hired in year t when he is age a (e  )  equals the present-value  t,a 
sum of the products of annual compensation,  given by the w(  ...)  s,  times the 
probabilities, given by the q(  ...)  s,  that the worker will remain with the firm 
until the year in question to collect the compensation. 
While the length of employment is uncertain, the assumption of risk- 
neutral employers and risk-averse workers,  whose productive characteristics 
are fully known  by the firm,  implies that the actual annual compensation 
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worker joins the firm. 
Assuming the structure of the compensation contract is constant through 
time, the ratio of compensation at age i+l  to compensation at age i is inde- 
pendent of time; that is, 
If the age-productivity relationship and the probabilities of departure are 
also assumed to be time invariant, the third arguments in the functions h(..,) 
and q(  ...) can be dropped. 
Letting Bs  stand for the marginal revenue product in year s of an effec- 
tive unit of labor (PSFls), equations (4), (5), and (6) imply that 
t+75-a 
(7)  w(a, a,  t)  C  p  (a+s-t ,  a)  (a+s-t ,  a)~'-~ 
s-t 
t+7  5-a  -  C  ~,B,~(a+s-t, a)h(a+s-t  ,  a)Rset. 
s-t 
In  equation (7),  the left side expresses the present expected value of 
compensation payments for a worker hired at age a in year t in terms of the 
worker's  first-year compensation,  w(a,a,t),  and his expected on-the-job  wage 
growth,  which is given by the p(  ...)  s multiplied by the probability of 
remaining with the firm,  the q(  ...)  s,  and then discounted. 
The assumption of myopic expectations permits writing EtBs - Bt, and (7) 
can be expressed as 
t+75-a 
(8)  C(a, t) =  Bt  X q(a+s-t  ,a)h(a+s-t  ,a)~~-~  = BtH(a), 
s-t 
where C(a,t)  stands for the left side of equation (7):  the present expected 
compensation of a worker hired at age a in year t.  Equation (8)  indicates 
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productivity of a worker hired at age a can be written as the product of a 
term involving the firm's expected,  as of year t,  overall productivity per 
unit of effective labor input (Bt)  and a term indicating the present expected 
number of units of effective labor input of a worker hired at age a,  H(a). 
To gain some intuition about the relationship between the present 
expected value of compensation,  C(..),  and the productivity relationship, 
h(..),  which is a function of age and age of hire,  consider the simple case in 
which there is a constant probability p of staying with the firm each year. 
Here,  q(i,a)  = pi-a; h..  depends only on age,  that is,  h(i,a)  = v)  and Bt 
equals unity (it is time-invariant).  In this case, the present expected value 
of compensation paid to a worker hired at age a can be expressed as a time- 
*  invariant function C (a),  where C(a,t)  - c*(a).  Manipulation of equation (8) 
leads to 
Equation (9)  expresses the worker's productivity at age a in terms of the 
difference in the present value of compensation paid to workers hired at age a 
and workers hired at age a+l.  This equation is the analogue to the difference 
Z -Z  in the very simple model discussed above.  Y  0 
The first difference of equation (9) gives the growth in productivity 
with age  : that is, 
From equation (9),  if the product of the survival rate and the interest rate, 
pR, equaled unity,  productivity at age a,  v(a),  would just equal the 
difference in the present expected value of compensation of workers hired at 
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tion of younger hires would always exceed that of older hires (assuming 
positive values of v(a)  at all ages).  If,  on the other hand, the annual prob- 
ability of departing the firm is high, pR will be much less than unity, and a 
value of c*(a+l)  in excess of c*(a)  is consistent with positive values of 
v(a> 
The formula for changes in productivity with age is given in equation 
(10).  In some cases,  one can read the age-productivity relationship from the 
slope of the profile of present expected compensation by age, ~"(a) , and the 
knowledge that pR<1.  For example,  productivity is constant with age in the 
range of ages over which the c*(a)  profile is flat.  One can also tell that 
productivity rises with age over the ranges in which ~"(a)  is rising,  but at a 
decreasing rate; the intuition here is that a positive but flattening slope of 
~"(a) means that the immediate positive slope of ~"(a) (the difference in 
c*(a+l)  and ~*(a))  is due to productivity at age a+l, v(a+l),  exceeding 
productivity at age a,  v(a),  rather than due to later marginal products 
exceeding v(a).  If ~"(a) is rising,  but at an increasing rate,  one cannot say 
whether productivity at age a+l exceeds or falls short of productivity at age 
a.  Similarly, one can tell that productivity declines with age over ranges of 
ages in which ~"(a)  declines with age at a decreasing rate;  however, if cX(a) 
declines with age at an increasing rate,  one cannot tell whether productivity 
is decreasing or increasing with age. 
Returning to the general case,  equation (8) can be transformed into an 
econometric relation by appending a multiplicative error term, eeast,j,  where 
the subscript j  references the individual  worker.  The error term can be 
viewed as a worker-specific productivity factor.  Its inclusion in the model 
means that workers hired at the same age in the same occupation/sex  category 
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heterogeneity as well as selectivity based on the r a,  t,j  's.  While workers 
hired at particular ages, or in certain years, may be more or less productive 
than workers hired at other ages or in other years without biasing the 
results, the model does require the same wage-growth  contract and the 
same departure rates for all workers within an occupation/sex group.  Taking 
logarithms of the resulting expression yields 
Here  , ca  ,  t  ,  j is the logarithm of C(a,t)  for worker j  who is age a in year t. 
While h(..)  can, in principle, be parameterized as a function of service as 
well as age, in practice the resulting cumulative age and cumulative service 
variables are too colinear to estimate separate age and service coefficients. 
Hence, we parameterize the productivity function  h(..)  as simply a cubic 
function  of age, and acknowledge that the age-productivity results reported 
2  below confound service-productivity effects.2  Letting h(k,a) - alk + a2k  + 
a3k3,  H(a)  can be written as 
t+75-a 
(12)  H(a)  - a1 P  q(a+s-t, a)  (a+s-t)RS-t 
s-t 
t+75-a 
+ a2  P  q(a+s-t ,  a)  (a+s-t)  2~s-t 
s-t 
t+75-a 
+ a3  P  q(a+s-t) (~+s-~)~Rs-~. 
s-t 
One cannot separately identify all four of the parameters in equations 
(11) and (12), Bt, al, a2, and a3.  TO see this, substitute from equation (12) 
into equation (11) and divide both sides of the resulting expression  by al; 
observe that the resulting constant term will equal loget +  logal.  Since this 
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eter al is normalized to unity. With this normalization and using equation 
(12),  equation (11) can now be expressed as 
(11'  c  a,t,j  - loget + log[Xl(a)  + a2X2(a)  + a3X3(a) I  +  ea, t,  J , 
where Xl(a),  X2(a),  and X3(a)  are the respective sums on the right side of 
equation (12).  Equation (11')  can be estimated nonlinearly.  Because time 
enters only through the intercept term loget,  data for workers hired in 
different years can  be pooled by simply entering year dummies.  Given the 
estimated value of the a2 and ag and the normalization al-1, we can determine 
3  the shape of the h(k,a)-olk  + a2k2 + a3k  function. 
11. The Data and Empirical Imvlementation 
The large firm's data used in this study are earnings histories covering 
the period 1969 through 1983 of workers employed in the firm at some time 
during the period 1980 through 1983.  The workers are classified into three 
rather broad occupation/sex groups: male office workers, female office 
workers, salesmen,  saleswomen,  and male managers.  There are too few female 
managers to warrant their analysis.  Unfortunately, no additional demographic 
variables are available for inclusion in the analysis.  Appendix table I 
presents the distribution of the observations by age of hire and occupa- 
tion/sex groups. 
The firm has a defined-benefit plan with a fairly complex set of age- and 
service-related benefits.  A percent-of-earnings  formula computes the basic 
retirement annuity,  which equals a percentage rate times the number of years 
of service for workers with fewer than 26 years of service.  For those with 
more service, the formula equals 25 times the former percentage rate,  plus the 
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is offset by the amount of Social Security benefits the firm predicts the 
worker will receive.  The predicted Social Security benefit is derived from 
another age-  and service-related formula unique to the firm. 
The normal retirement age under the pension plan is 65, and the early 
retirement age is 55.  For workers who retire after the early retirement age, 
but before the normal retirement age, there is a special early retirement 
benefit reduction table based on the the worker's  age and service.  Those who 
terminate employment before age 55 are not eligible for the generous early- 
retirement reduction rates and instead face actuarially reduced benefits. 
Another important penalty for workers who terminate before the early retire- 
ment age is that their Social Security offset is not deferred until they reach 
age 65.  The postponement of this offset until age 65 if the worker stays with 
the firm until the early retirement age produces a substantial vested pension 
accrual at age 55 as compared to the rather modest accrual prior to age 55. 
After age 55, the accrual is much smaller and, indeed, can become negative. 
The survival probabilities, the q(  , )'s,  used in constructing c  a,t,j and 
the variables in equations (10')  and (13) were calculated separately for each 
of the five age-occupation/sex  groups in the following manner.  First, we 
calculated the fraction of workers at a given age and initial age of hire who 
remain in the firm from one year to the next.  Next, we smoothed these annual 
survival hazards using a second-order polynomial in age, age squared, years of 
service, years of service squared, and age times years of service.  Finally, 
we computed the cumulative survival probabilities, the q(  , )Is, based on the 
smoothed annual survival probabilities. 
The data used in the regressions of annual survival hazards encompass the 
years 1980 through 1984.  For these years, we have complete employment 
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firm.  Unfortunately,  while we have the complete employment/earnings histories 
going back to 1969 for those workers hired prior to 1980  who were still 
employed with the firm from 1980 though 1984,  we do not have any information 
on those workers hired prior to 1980 who did not remain with the firm through 
1980.  Hence,  in forming the empirical hazards,  we can use data only from 1980 
2  through 1984.  The R 's in these regressions are 0.23 for male office workers, 
0.29 for female office workers, 0.12 for salesmen,  0.01 for saleswomen,  and 
0.21 for male managers.  The respective number of observations in these 
regressions are 1,344,  1,387,  1,274,  630,  and 963.  The smaller number of 
observations for saleswomen reflects the fact that we lack data in  certain age 
and age-of-hire  cells on the fraction of saleswomen remaining with the firm 
between one year and the next.  The missing data typically involve saleswomen 
hired at older ages and,  for a given age of hire, saleswomen  who are older. 
The explanation is that most saleswomen in the firm are hired at young ages 
and have high probabilities of leaving the firm within a few years. 
Table I  presents the smoothed survival function  q(  , )  for the different 
occupation/sex groups at selected ages and ages of hire.  Table I indicates 
substantial differences in  job survival rates across the five groups; 34.3 
percent of male managers who hire on at age 30 are predicted to remain  with 
the firm 25 years later.  For male and female office workers, the comparable 
percentages are 21.5 and 14.2,  respectively.  For salesmen and saleswomen,  the 
respective percentages are 5.4 and 2.3.  The table also demonstrates that 
workers hired at older ages,  at least through age 50,  have larger probabil- 
ities of remaining with the firm for a given period of time than do workers 
hired at younger ages. 
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compensation, including pension compensation;  but in order to determine the 
course of pension compensation,  one first needs to know the course of nonpen- 
sion compensation.  Hence,  we first estimated the function p*(  , ) , which 
gives the growth in nonpension compensation,  by regressing observed growth 
rates in earnings, excluding pension compensation,  against a second-order 
polynomial in age,  age squared,  service,  service squared, age times service, 
age squared times service,  service squared times age,  and age squared times 
service squared.  In these regressions we used data on workers' earnings 
histories going back to 1969.  We eliminated the first and last year (for 
those workers who departed) of earnings because we were not sure those 
earnings represented a full year's  nonpension compensation.  Hence,  a worker 
needs to remain with the firm for at least four years to have his wage growth 
data included in the regression; for example, a worker who remains with the 
firm for only three years will have only one year -  his second year -  of 
usable earnings data -  an insufficient amount with which to calculate a value 
for wage growth. 
We have a large number of observations in these regressions,  since each 
worker who remains with the firm for several years supplies more than one 
observation on the growth in nonpension compensation.  The number of observa- 
tions in these regressions total 71,903  for male office workers, 132,543  for 
female office workers, 201,467  for salesmen,  6,482  for saleswomen, and 33,285 
for male managers.  The smaller number of observations for saleswomen shows 
that, compared to other types of workers,  a much smaller fraction of sales- 
women remain with the firm for the four years needed to enter our regression 
sample.  Given the large number of observations and the small number (eight) 
of regressors,  it may not be surprising that the R~'S  are small: 0.04 for male 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmoffice workers,  0.04  for female office workers,  0.01 for salesmen,  0.01 for 
saleswomen,  and  0.03 for male  managers. 
Obviously,  much  of  the variation in nonpension  compensation as well as in 
the survival hazards is not dependent  on  age  and\or  age  of  hire.  This does 
not appear  to present a problem  for our analysis because we  are interested in 
determining the expected  (ex ante) present value of  compensation,  not the 
realized (ex post) present value  of  compensation.  Although  random  factors may 
raise or lower  a worker's  survival probabilities or wage  growth  above  or below 
that which would  be  forecast ex ante, it is only the ex ante forecast that we 
need to assess.  We  should also note,  in this context,  that despite the low 
2  R  's in the survival and wage  growth  regressions,  the predicted survival rates 
and  wage  growth  rates differ considerably across workers who  are in different 
occupation/sex  groups,  but who  were  hired at the same  age,  and  across workers 
in the same  occupation/sex  group,  but who  were hired at different ages.  It is 
these differences that provide  the identification needed  for this analysis. 
The  initial wage,  together with the smoothed function for growth  in 
*  nonpension  compensation  (p  (  , )  function), provides a path of  nonpension 
compensation that can be  used to calculate the path of  pension accrual.  The 
path of  nonpension  plus pension compensation is then used  to form  the present 
expected value of  total compensation,  the c  a,t,  j '"' 
Table I1 presents the smoothed nonpension  compensation  growth  rate 
function p*(  , )  for the different occupation/sex  groups  at selected ages and 
ages  of  hire.  Table I1  indicates that the age  of hire is also an important 
factor in real wage  growth.  According  to the regression, workers hired at 
later ages often experience  greater real wage  growth  than those hired at 
younger  ages.  In addition, wage  growth  for female  office workers  and  sales- 
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their male occupational counterparts. 
A reduced-form regression can help to illustrate the shape of the age 
profile of the present expected value of compensation.  This regression 
relates the logarithm of the present expected value of compensation (calcu- 
lated using the initial wage, the q(  , )  survival function,  and the p(  , ) 
compensation growth function) to a set of year dummies and a polynomial in 
age.  The exponent of the coefficients of this polynomial in age multiplied by 
their respective variables indicates the shape of the profile of age/present 
expected value of compensation.  Figure I presents this profile for each of 
the five occupation/sex groups normalized by the age 40 level of this profile. 
Notice that each of the normalized profiles of present expected compensation 
rises at early ages at a decreasing rate, suggesting,  as indicated above, that 
productivity rises with age at these ages.  In addition, each of the profiles, 
except that of saleswomen,  declines at a decreasing rate in old age, 
suggesting that productivity declines with age at these ages for at least the 
other occupation/sex groups. 
111. Estimates of the Aee-Productivitv Profile 
Table I11 presents the regression results from estimating equation (11') 
assuming a 6  percent interest rate.  Recall that this regression relates the 
logarithm of the present expected value of compensation to year dummies and 
the logarithm of the sum of three nonlinear functions of age multiplied by 
three coefficients,  one of which is normalized to unity.  In this regression, 
only observations on workers hired during the years 1970 through 1983 are 
included, since pension accrual for workers hired prior to 1970 could not be 
determined.  All of the age-squared and age-cubed coefficients reported in the 
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suggesting that the modeling of expectations of future 4's  may be important. 
The regression coefficients are little affected by the choice of interest 
rate; the regressions were repeated assuming interest rates of both 3 percent 
and 9  percent, and the coefficients are very similar to those reported in 
table 111. 
Figures I1 through VI are based on the 6 percent interest rate regres- 
sions of table 111.  They present the age-productivity profiles (dashed lines) 
predicted by the regressions for the five occupation/sex groups for workers 
hired initially at age 35.  They also present the age-total compensation 
profile implied by the smoothed compensation growth function p(  , )s  and the 
pattern of pension accrual.  The age 35 initial level of productivity (Bt  in 
equation (8))  and compensation (w(a,a,t)  in equation (7))  are chosen to ensure 
that both the present expected value of compensation and the present expected 
value of marginal product equal $500,000. 
While productivity initially rises with age in each figure,  it eventually 
starts declining with age.  For male office workers,  productivity peaks at age 
45 and declines thereafter.  Age 65  productivity is less than one-third of 
peak productivity for this group.  The female office workers' productivity 
profile is quite similar to that of the male office workers.  Productivity 
profiles for both the salesmen and saleswomen peak a few years later than 
those of office workers,  but their rate of decline with age is quite similar. 
Productivity for male managers peaks at age 43;  by age 60  productivity is less 
than one-third of peak productivity,  and productivity actually becomes 
negative after age 62. 
In four of the figures,  productivity exceeds total compensation while the 
worker is young and then falls below total compensation; in the remaining 
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quite similar to the other four groups,  except after age 61,  when productivity 
again exceeds compensation.  Except for the kinks in the age-compensation 
profiles associated with pension accrual,  the age-compensation profiles and 
age-productivity profiles for salesmen and saleswomen are very close to one 
another at each age.  This is predictable,  because salesworkers in this firm 
are paid, in large part, on a commission  basis. 
In  contrast to the results for salesworkers,  one might expect the weakest 
connection  between annual earnings and annual productivity among male 
managers.  Figure IV indicates this is indeed the case.  At age 35,  produc- 
tivity for male managers exceeds total compensation  by greater than a factor 
of two,  while compensation is more than twice as high as productivity by age 
57.  The discrepancies between total compensation and productivity at these 
ages are somewhat smaller for office workers,  but still significant.  For 
example,  age 35 total compensation for female office workers is $22,616,  while 
age 35 productivity is $33,604.  In  contrast,  age 57 total compensation is 
$42,526,  although productivity is only $28,117. 
The results depicted in figures I1 through VI are not sensitive to the 
inclusion of pension accrual in total compensation; if one ignores pension 
accrual in the estimation, the age-earnings and age-productivity profiles have 
the same relative shapes as those presented.  Of course, the age-earnings 
profile does not exhibit the kinks of the age-total compensation  profile, 
since these kinks arise from pension accrual.  Ignoring pension accrual,  one 
can then use the data on workers hired prior to 1970.  While the initial wage 
of those hired prior to 1969 is not reported, it can be inferred based on the 
wage observed in 1969 and the compensation growth function  p(  ); that is,  one 
can impute backwards the wage at the initial age of hire.  The results based 
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through VI.  The general shapes of the age-total compensation  profiles and 
age-productivity profiles are also insensitive to the choice of interest rate. 
Another concern about the results is the extent to which the profiles 
described here as age-productivity profiles confound service-productivity 
effects.  Unfortunately, the colinearity between cumulated service and age 
variables precludes modeling the h(..)  function as a continuous function of 
both age and age of hire.  An alternative way to explore this issue is to 
model h(..)  as depending only on age,  but to estimate the model separately for 
workers hired at different ages.  If one estimates the model separately for 
those hired prior to age 35 and for those hired after age 35,  the resulting 
general shapes of the productivity profiles are quite similar to those based 
on the entire sample.  The post-35 profiles are indeed very similar,  while the 
pre-35 profiles exhibit a steeper decline in productivity with age,  with 
negative predicted productivity after roughly age 55.  This prediction of 
negative productivity late in the work span may simply represent a poor fit in 
the tail of the estimated polynomial. 
IV. Can Differences in Age-Productivitv and Age-Com~ensation  Profiles Ex~lain 
Low Value of Firms' a's? 
In  paying workers less than their productivity when young, a firm incurs 
implicit obligations to pay its workers more than their productivity when they 
are old.  Although this implicit financial obligation does not show  up on a 
firm's books (given standard accounting practices),  it will be reflected in 
the firm's market value,  making the ratio of the market value of a firm to the 
replacement cost of its capital (q)  less than unity. 
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the expression for the firm's  market value (present value of expected profits) 
in year t, nt, and equation (4),  the firm's  rule for hiring new workers. 
m 
(3')  nt - Et X  [PsYs - I,]R~-~ 
s-t 
75  t  75 
- ' '  Ns,aes,a 
p-t - ' '  Ns,aDs,a. 
s-t  a918  s-t-57  a-18 
Recall that Et is the expectation operator at time t,  Ps is the real price of 
output Y,  in year s,  R is one divided by one plus the real interest rate, Is 
is investment in year s (Is-Ks+l-Ks),  e  is the present (discounted to year  s,  a 
s) expected value of compensation payments to workers hired in year s at age 
a,  NS,,  is the number of workers hired at age a in year s, and Ds,a is the 
present expected value of remaining compensation payments to workers hired at 
age a in year s<t.  In equation (3'),  output in year s,  Ys, may be written as 
the marginal product of labor in year s,  FlS, times the supply of labor, Ls, 
plus the marginal product of capital in year s, Fks, times the supply of 
capital, Ks.  Dividing equation (3')  by Kt and applying the first-order condi- 
tion (4) leads to expression (13) for qt-nt/Kt. 
m 
(13)  qt - Et X  [PsFksKs - I~~R~-~/K~ 
s-t 
t+5  6  s  75 
+  E  X  PSFls  X  x  Nj ,,q(a+s-j  ,a,s>h(a+s-j  ,a,s)/Kt 
t s-t  j-s-57  a-18 
Equation (13) indicates that qt, the ratio of the firm's  market value to 
its replacement cost, equals (a) the present value of expected total returns 
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future investment -  all divided by Kt,  plus (b)  the present value of expected 
productivity of labor hired prior to year t, less (c)  the present value of 
compensation  still owed to labor hired prior to year t.  If the labor market 
were a spot market, then the present expected value of workers' future produc- 
tivity would equal the present expected value of workers' compensation,  since 
each year's  compensation  would equal each year's productivity.  In this case, 
the last two terms in equation (13) would cancel,  and q would simply equal the 
expected present discounted value of returns to capital less the cost of 
investment.  With the condition that the marginal revenue product of capital 
in year s equals the interest rate, it is easy to show that the firm's market 
value at time t,  xt, simply equals Kt, the replacement  value of its capital; 
that is, in the case of a spot labor market (and ignoring capital adjustment 
costs and inframarginal capital income taxes),  the firm's q - the ratio of 
its market value to its replacement cost - equals unity. 
While the firm's q is unity assuming a spot labor market, it is less than 
unity if the firm pays its workers less than their productivity when the 
workers are young and more than their productivity when the workers are old. 
To see this,  note that the difference between the last two terms in equation 
(13)  equals the present-value difference between the productivity and 
compensation  of all existing workers at time t divided by Kt.  Because each of 
these workers was hired subject to the first-order condition that productivity 
equals compensation  in present value over the work span,  and because each of 
these workers was underpaid at some point in the past, the difference for each 
worker between the present value of his future productivity and his compensa- 
tion  will be negative. (This ignores unexpected changes in the firm's price of 
output and production technology and assumes that productivity and compensa- 
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unity. 
In determining the amount of backloaded compensation (the present-value 
difference between expected future compensation and productivity),  we consider 
each of the workers in our data in 1980 with at least one year of service. 
For all of these workers, we first determine their past (back to their age of 
hire) and future wage earnings using their 1980 reported earnings and our 
calculated wage compensation growth profile.  To this absolute wage compensa- 
tion profile we add the appropriate yearly pension accrual.  We then calculate 
the present value of each worker's  total expected compensation  as of his date 
of hire.  Next we adjust the level of the worker's  age-productivity profile 
such that the present expected value of the absolute level of productivity as 
of the worker's  age of hire equals the present expected value of the worker's 
total compensation as of his age of hire.  Benchmarking the productivity 
profile against the compensation profile in this manner provides us with the 
worker's  level of productivity in 1980 and in all future years.  We use the 
1980 and subsequent productivity and compensation levels to compute the 
present-value difference between expected future compensation and produc- 
tivi  ty  . 
To get a rough idea of the potential impact on q of backloaded compensa- 
tion, denote the difference between the last two terms in equation (13) multi- 
plied by Kt as Bt, the present value of backloaded compensation,  and denote Zt 
as total year t compensation payments to the firm's  workers.  We can now write 
In evaluating equation (14),  we assume that Zt/rKt, the ratio of current 
earnings to capital income, equals 4,  the national average.  We also assume a 
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times the ratio of the year t present value of backloaded compensation to 
total compensation  payments in year t.  If this ratio equals 1 (0.5),  it means 
that backloaded compensation can explain a value of q that differs from unity 
by 0.4 (0.2).  For all of the workers included in our data in 1980 (which do 
not include all of the firm's  employees),  the ratio of Bt to Zt  equals 1.16. 
It equals 2.29 for male office workers, 1.38 for female office workers, 4.88 
for male managers, -0.30 for salesmen,  and 0.76 for saleswomen.  While addi- 
tional data that are not available would be needed to assess fully the impact 
of backloaded compensation on the firm's  value of q,  the values of Bt/Zt  for 
the five occupation/sex  groups are sufficiently large to suggest an important 
role for backloaded compensation in the firm's value of q. 
V. Conclusion 
The finding that productivity decreases with age must be viewed 
cautiously.  Contrary to what has been assumed, it may be the case that some 
workers within an occupation/sex category receive different contracts than do 
others.  Suppose that within an occupation/sex category there are type A and B 
workers and that type A workers receive contracts  with steeper compensation 
profiles as compared to contracts for type B workers.  Also assume that type A 
workers have smaller probabilities of remaining with the firm than type B 
workers.  If the composition of workers remaining with the firm changes, the 
estimated compensation growth function and the estimated job survival function 
would differ from those for either A  or B separately, or from those that would 
arise if the separate job survival and compensation growth functions for A and 
B were averaged using constant weights. 
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presented here could differ substantially from either the profile for type A 
workers or the profile for type B workers.  Similar biases may arise if the 
composition of type A and type B workers among new hires changes as the age of 
hire increases.  These potential biases need to be explored more formally, as 
does the possible bias arising from assuming static expectations of overall 
worker productivity. 
These concerns notwithstanding, the results are fairly striking.  Produc- 
tivity falls with age,  compensation at first lies below and then exceeds 
productivity,  and the discrepancy between compensation and productivity can be 
substantial.  Interestingly, there is a much closer correspondence of produc- 
tivity to compensation for salesworkers,  who are compensated more on a spot 
market basis, than for other types of workers.  Also, the relationship of 
productivity to compensation is weakest for male managers,  who, one would 
expect,  are most likely to be hired on a contract rather than a spot market 
basis.  In addition to confirming contract theory, the results lend support to 
the bonding wage models of Becker and Stigler (1974) and Lazear (1979,  1981). 
Finally, the results may help to explain low ratios of firms' market 
values to the replacement costs (q's)  of their capital.  When future compensa- 
tion exceeds future productivity for a firm's workers, as is the case for the 
firm considered here, it represents a liability that presumably willbe 
reflected in a lower market value of the firm and a lower value of q.  While 
the results reported here must be viewed cautiously,  if for no other reason 
than they apply only to a single firm,  they raise the possibility that back- 
loaded compensation is an important determinant of firms' q's. 
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1. We thank Lawrence Summers for pointing this out. 
2. To see why the estimation might confound age and service effects if service 
as well as age influences productivity, consider the case that productivity at 
a point in time is a linear function of age and service; that is, let h(k,a)  = 
@k  + A(k-a)  (recall that k stands for age and k-a  for service).  Consider 
first the case that the probability of leaving employment with the firm prior 
to a given age, D, is zero, but it is unity after age D.  In this case, the 
function H(a)  is given by 
D 
H(a)  = X[pk + A(k-a)]  = pa + A(D-a+l)(D-a)/2  = cp +  (B - A/2 - AD)a  + Aa2/2 
k-a 
and the estimation of equation (8) would yield two coefficients, one for a 
(age of hire) and one for a2 (age of hire squared).  The coefficient on a 
would combine both p and A  (age and service effects), while the coefficient on 
a2 would indicate the effect of service. 
Next consider the case of a constant probability p of remaining with the 
firm regardless of one's  age and of R equaling unity.  The term H(a)  in 
equation (8) would be given by 
In this case, the present expected contribution  of service to productivity is 
identical for all hires (and is captured by the constant 4),  and the estima- 
tion of equation (8) would recover only the coefficient p. 
More generally, when we allow for more complicated departure processes as 
well as productivity functions that are nonlinear in age and service, the H(a) 
function will be a highly nonlinear function of age and service parameters. 
Unfortunately, colinearity precludes estimating separate age and service 
parameters, and it proved necessary to make the identifying assumption of zero 
service effects.  The literature is mixed with respect to the effects of 
service on  wages.  Depending on one's  model of labor contracts, the findings 
of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) (but not of Lang [I9881 or Tope1 [1988]), that 
wages do not rise with service, may imply that productivity also does not rise 
with service. 
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Predicted Probabilities of Remaining with the Firm from 
Age of Hire to Specified Age by Occupation/Sex Group 
Aae of Hire  25 
Male Office Workers 
20  0.461 
3  0 
40 
5  0 
6  0 
Female Office Workers 
2  0  0.472 
3  0 
40 
50 
6  0 
Salesmen 
20  0.286 
3  0 
40 
50 
6  0 
Saleswomen 
2  0  0.301 
30 
40 
5  0 
6  0 
Male Managers 
20  0.622 
30 
40 
5  0 
6  0 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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Predicted Annual Wage Compensation Growth Rates for 
Specific Ages and Ages of Hire by Occupation/Sex Group 
(percentage growth rate) 
Age 
Aee of Hire  25 
Male Office Workers 
20  0.071 
3  0 
40 
50 
6  0 
Female Office Workers 
20  0.047 
30 
40 
5  0 
60 
Salesmen 
2  0  0.016 
30 
40 
5  0 
60 
Saleswomen 
20  0.042 
3  0 
40 
5  0 
60 
Male Managers 
2  0  0.090 
30 
40 
5  0 
60 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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Age-Productivity  ~e~ressions~ 
Males  Females 
Variable  Office Workers  Salesmen Manapers  Office Workers Saleswomen 
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Males  Females 
Variable  Office Workers  Salesmen Manaeers 
Number 
of Obser.  7,083  19,696  2,116 
Office Workers Saleswomen 
a. Regressions of logarithm of the present value of compensation (assuming a 6 
percent interest rate) against year dummies and the logarithm of the sum of 
three nonlinear functions of age.  D71 - D83 are the year dummies.  The coef- 
ficients a  and a3 multiply two of the three nonlinear functions of age (see 
equation [ 1  1'1). 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
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Distribution of Workers 
by Age of Hire and Occupation/Sex Group 
(percent of workers hired in given age range) 
<20  20-24  25-29  30-34  35-39  40-44  45-49  50-54  55+ 
Male 
Managers  0  31.0  33.9  19.1  9.2  4.6  1.6  .5  .1 
Sales-  0  18.4  28.1  22.5  14.6  9.1  4.6  1.9  .6 
men 
Sales-  0  12.1  19.7  20.3  21.1  15.2  8.0  3.1  .5 
women 
Maleoffice  0  45.3  29.0  11.8  5.3  3.2  2.3  1.9  1.0 
Workers 
Female Office  0  44.9  17.3  11.4  9.7  7.5  5.0  2.9  1.2 
Workers 
a. Rows may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.  This table is based on 
3,860  male managers, 25,858 salesmen, 2,054  saleswomen, 9,220  male office 
workers, and 22,361 female office workers. 
Source: Authors1  calculations. 
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A  =  Male Managers 
B  = Saleswomen 
C  = Salesmen 
D  =  Female Office Workers 
E  =  Male Office Workers 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm*  =  Total Compensation 
0  =  Productivity 
Figure II 
Total Compensation and Productivity Profiles (1  980 dollars) 
Present Value = 500,000, R = 6%,  Male Office Workers 
cow 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
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Total Compensation and Productivity Profiles (1  980 dollars) 
Present Value = 500,000, R = 6%,  Male Salesworkers 
cone 
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Source: Authors' calculations. 
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Total Conipe~isation  and Prodl~ctivity  Profiles (1  980 dollars) 
Present Value = 500,000, R = 6%, Male Managers 
COHP 
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*  =  Total Compensation 
0 =  Productivity 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
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Total Compensation and Productivity Profiles (1  980 dollars) 
Present Value = 500,000,  R = 6%,  Female Office Workers 
cow 
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*  = Total Compensation 
0  =  Productivity 
Source:  Authors' calculations. 
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Total Compensation and Productivity Profiles (1  980 dollars) 
Present Value = 500,000, R = 6%,  Feniale Salesworkers 
*  =  Total Compensation 
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